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Law and Policy of Targeted Killing† 
 
 
 
Gabriella Blum* and Philip Heymann** 
   
 
I.  Introduction 
 
Imagine  that  the  U.S.  intelligence  services  obtain  reliable 
information that a known individual is plotting a terrorist attack against the 
United States.  The individual is outside the United States, in a country 
where law and order are weak and unreliable.  U.S. officials can request 
that  country  to  arrest  the  individual,  but  they  fear  that  by  the  time  the 
individual is located, arrested, and extradited the terror plot would be too 
advanced, or would already have taken place.  It is also doubtful that the 
host government is either able or willing to perform the arrest.  Moreover, 
even if it did arrest the suspected terrorist, it might decide to release him 
shortly thereafter, exposing the U.S. to a renewed risk.  Should the United 
States  be  allowed  to  kill  the  suspected  terrorist  in  the  foreign  territory, 
without first capturing, arresting, and trying him? 
 
More  than  any  other  counterterrorism  tactic,  targeted  killing 
operations display the tension between addressing terrorism as a crime and 
addressing it as war.  The right of a government to use deadly force against 
a citizen is constrained by both domestic criminal law and international 
human rights norms that seek to protect the individual’s right to life and 
liberty.  In law enforcement, individuals are punished for their individual 
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guilt.  Guilt must be proven in a court of law, with the individual facing trial 
enjoying the protections of due process guarantees. Killing an individual 
without  trial  is  allowed  only  in  very  limited  circumstances,  such  as  self- 
defense  (where  the  person  poses  an  immediate  threat)  or  the  immediate 
necessity of saving more lives.  In almost any other case, it would be clearly 
unlawful, tantamount to extrajudicial execution or murder. 
  
When agents of a state seek to engage in enforcement operations 
outside their own territory without consent of the foreign government, they 
are further constrained by international norms of peaceful relations and the 
respect for territorial boundaries among states.  Ordinarily, when a criminal 
suspect finds refuge in another country, the United States would ask the 
other  country  for  extradition  to  gain  jurisdiction  over  him.    Even 
interviewing a person outside of U.S. territory would be unlawful; executing 
him would be an extremely egregious offense.  Violations of these norms 
run the risk of replacing law with force and spiraling international violence. 
  
In wartime, governments may use deadly force against combatants 
of an enemy party, in which case the peacetime constraints are relaxed.  But 
in war, the enemy combatants belong to another identifiable party and are 
killed not because they are guilty, but because they are potentially lethal 
agents of that hostile party.  Moreover, soldiers are easily identified by the 
uniform they wear.  Once in the uniform of an enemy state, any soldier, by 
commitment  and  allegiance,  is  a  potential  threat  and  thus  a  legitimate 
target, regardless of the degree of threat the soldier is actually posing at any 
particular moment: the relaxing, unarmed soldier, the sleeping soldier, the 
retreating  soldier—all  are  legitimate  military  targets  and  subject  to 
intentional targeting.  No advance warning is necessary, no attempt to arrest 
or capture is required, and no effort to minimize casualties among enemy 
forces is demanded by law. 
 
The identity and culpability of an individual not wearing a uniform 
but  suspected  of  involvement  in  terrorism  is  far  less  easily  ascertained.  
While  combatants  should  not  benefit  from  defying  the  obligation  to 
distinguish themselves from civilians (wearing civilian clothes does not give a 
soldier legal immunity from direct attack), the lack of uniform does raise 
concerns about the ability to identify individuals as belonging to a hostile Harvard National Security Journal / Vol. 1  147 
force.1  Moreover, joining a military follows a distinct procedure that allows 
for a bright-line rule distinguishing between those in the military and those 
outside it (although it hides the dangerous responsibility of civilians who take 
part in hostile activity without being members of the armed forces).  Joining 
a terrorist organization does not necessarily have a similar on/off switch; 
individuals might join the organization or support it in some ways or for 
some time, but then go back to their ordinary business without any ritual 
marking  their  joining  or  departing.    Identifying  individuals  as  terrorists 
grows more difficult as organizations, such as Al-Qaeda, become a network 
of small dispersed cells, or even individuals, making the association with a 
hostile armed group even more tenuous. 
  
Despite these difficulties, both the United States and Israel (as well as 
several  other  countries)  have  made  targeted  killing—the  deliberate 
assassination of a known terrorist outside the country’s territory (even in a 
friendly nation’s territory), usually (but not exclusively) by an airstrike—an 
essential part of their counterterrorism strategy.  Both have found targeted 
killing an inevitable means of frustrating the activities of terrorists who are 
directly  involved  in  plotting  and  instigating  attacks  from  outside  their 
territory. 
  
Adopting  a  position  on  targeted  killings  involves  complex  legal, 
political,  and  moral  judgments  with  very  broad  implications.    Targeted 
killing is the most coercive tactic employed in the war on terrorism.  Unlike 
detention  or  interrogation,  it  is  not  designed  to  capture  the  terrorist, 
monitor his or her actions, or extract information; simply put, it is designed 
to eliminate the terrorist.  More than any other counterterrorism practice, it 
reveals the complexity involved in classifying counterterrorism operations 
either as part of a war or as a law enforcement operation. 
  
A targeted killing entails an entire military operation that is planned 
and  executed  against  a  particular,  known  person.    In  war,  there  is  no 
prohibition on the killing of a known enemy combatant; for the most part, 
wars  are  fought  between  anonymous  soldiers,  and  bullets  have  no 
designated names on them.  The image of a powerful army launching a 
highly sophisticated guided missile from a distance, often from a Predator 
drone, against a specific individual driving an unarmored vehicle or walking 
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down the street starkly illustrates the difference between counterinsurgency 
operations and the traditional war paradigm.  Moreover, the fact that all 
targeted  killing  operations  in  combating  terrorism  are  directed  against 
particular  individuals  makes  the  tactic  more  reminiscent  of  a  law 
enforcement paradigm, where power is employed on the basis of individual 
guilt  rather  than  status  (civilian/combatant).    Unlike  a  law  enforcement 
operation, however, there are no due process guarantees: the individual is 
not forewarned about the operation, is not given a chance to defend his 
innocence, and there is no assessment of his guilt by any impartial body. 
  
The  uneasiness  about  classifying  and  evaluating  targeted  killings 
further  grows  as  these  operations  are  carried  out  outside  an  immediate 
battlefield,  such  as  in  Yemen,  Pakistan,  or  Somalia.    Justifying  targeted 
killings in those countries faces the challenges of the constraints of peaceful 
international  relations  or  else  a  potentially  unlimited  expansion  of  the 
geographical scope of the armed conflict beyond the immediate theater of 
war.  There are slippery slope concerns of excessive use of targeted killings 
against individuals or in territories that are harder to justify.  Recent reports 
about a U.S. “hit list” of Afghan drug lords, even though supposedly taking 
place in an active combat zone, have sparked criticism that drug lords, even 
when  they  finance  the  Taliban,  do  not  fit  neatly  within  the  concept  of 
“combatant,” and must instead be treated with law enforcement tools.2 
   
Concerns about the use of targeted killings grow as collateral harm is 
inflicted on innocent bystanders in the course of attacks aimed at terrorists.  
In war, collateral damage to civilians, if proportionate to the military gain, is 
a  legitimate,  however  dire,  consequence  of  war.    In  domestic  law 
enforcement, the police must hold their fire if they believe that there is a 
danger to innocent bystanders, except where using lethal force against a 
suspect  is  reasonably  believed  likely  to  reduce  the  number  of  innocent 
deaths. 
 
To  make  this  tactic  acceptable  to  other  nations,  targeted  killings 
must  be  justified  and  accounted  for  under  a  set  of  norms  that  may  not 
correspond  perfectly  to  either  peacetime  or  wartime  paradigms,  but  is 
nonetheless respectful of the values and considerations espoused by both.  In 
                                                 
2 For a report on the U.S. “hit list,” see Craig Whitlock, Afghans Oppose U.S. Hit List of Drug 
Traffickers, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 2009, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/10/23/AR2009102303709.html.   
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this  chapter  we  consider  the  advantages  and  disadvantages  of  choosing 
either paradigm as our starting point, thereafter subjecting the paradigm to 
necessary modifications for application to the counterterrorism context.  We 
do  so  by  assessing  the  American  and  Israeli  experience  in  employing 
targeted killings and its legal, moral, and strategic implications.  
 
II.  The Practice of Targeted Killing 
 
A.  The United States 
 
Countries have been in the business of targeted assassinations for 
centuries.  The United States has been a more recent participant.  The U.S. 
Senate Select Committee chaired by Senator Frank Church (the Church 
Committee) reported in 1975 that it had found evidence of no less than 
eight  plots  involving  CIA  efforts  to  assassinate  Fidel  Castro,  as  well  as 
assassination plots against President Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam and 
General Rene Schneider of Chile.  During the Vietnam War, the Phoenix 
Program planned the assassination of Viet Cong leaders and sympathizers.  
In 1986, President Ronald Reagan ordered Operation El Dorado Canyon, 
which  included  an  air  raid  on  the  residence  of  Libyan  ruler  Muammar 
Qaddafi.  Qaddafi remained unscathed, but his daughter was killed. 
 
Assassination plots by both the United States and other countries 
were not publicly acknowledged, justified, or accounted for.  Rather, they 
were taken to be an element of that part of foreign relations that always 
remains in the dark, outside official protocol or lawful interaction, unspoken 
of, but understood to be “part of the international game.”  Many of the 
plots never became public knowledge; few, if any, enjoyed enduring public 
acceptance. 
 
The  political  fallout  of  the  Church  Committee’s  criticism  of  the 
covert  assassination  program  during  the  Cold  War  brought  President 
Gerald  Ford  to  promulgate  an  executive  order  banning  assassinations,  a 
prohibition that was later incorporated into Executive Order 12333 (1981) 
signed by President Ronald Reagan and that remains in effect today.  The 
executive order was part of the reason that those responsible for planning 
military actions prior to 1998 took great care to avoid any appearance of 
targeting specific individuals. 
 2010 / Law and Policy of Targeted Killing 
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However, following the 1998 bombings of the American embassies 
in  Kenya  and  Tanzania,  and  on  the  basis  of  a  (secret)  favorable  legal 
opinion, President Bill Clinton issued a presidential finding (equivalent to an 
executive order) authorizing the use of lethal force in self-defense against Al-
Qaeda in Afghanistan.  Shortly thereafter, seventy-five Tomahawk cruise 
missiles were launched at a site in Afghanistan where Osama Bin Laden was 
expected to attend a summit meeting.  Following the attacks of September 
11,  2001,  President  George  Bush  reportedly  made  another  finding  that 
broadened the class of potential targets beyond the top leaders of Al-Qaeda, 
and  also  beyond  the  boundaries  of  Afghanistan.    Secretary  of  Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld ordered Special Operations units to prepare a plan for 
“hunter killer teams,” with the purpose of killing, not capturing, terrorist 
suspects.  Using the war paradigm for counterterrorism enabled government 
lawyers  to  distinguish  lethal  attacks  on  terrorists  from  prohibited 
assassinations and justify them as lawful battlefield operations against enemy 
combatants,  much  like  the  uncontroversial  targeted  killing  of  Japanese 
Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto while he was traveling by a military airplane 
during World War II.  According to reports, President Bush also gave the 
CIA, and later the military, authority to kill U.S. citizens abroad if there was 
strong evidence that an American was involved in organizing or carrying 
out acts of terrorism against the United States or U.S. interests.3 
  
The  first  publicly  known  targeted  killing  of  terrorists  outside  a 
theater  of  active  war  under  the  most  recent  presidential  finding  was  in 
Yemen  in  November  2002,  when  a  Predator  (unmanned  and  remotely 
operated) drone was launched at a car carrying Al-Harethi, suspected of the 
USS Cole bombing, along with four others, one of whom was an American 
citizen.    The  attack  in  Yemen  was  executed  with  the  approval  of  the 
government of Yemen, thereby eliminating some of the international legal 
difficulties associated with employing force in another country’s territory. 
 
Later,  the  United  States  engaged  in  a  number  of  targeted  killing 
operations in Pakistan, not all of which were authorized or approved by the 
Pakistani  government.    One  of  those  operations,  carried  out  in  January 
2006 and directed at Bin Laden’s deputy, Aiman al-Zawahiri, left eighteen 
civilians  dead  while  missing  al-Zawahiri  altogether  and  drawing  fierce 
domestic criticism of then-Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf. 
                                                 
3 Dana Priest, U.S. Military Teams, Intelligence Deeply Involved in Aiding Yemen on Strikes, WASH. 
POST, Jan. 27, 2010, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/01/26/AR2010012604239.html.  Harvard National Security Journal / Vol. 1  151 
 
Since 9/11, Predator drones have reportedly been used dozens of 
times by the United States to fire on targets in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, 
Yemen, and elsewhere.  The targeted killing operations have successfully 
killed a number of senior Al-Qaeda members, including its chief of military 
operations, Mohammad Atef. 
 
President  Barack  Obama’s  administration  has  not  changed  the 
policy on targeted killings; in fact, it ordered a “dramatic increase” in the 
drone-launched missile strikes against Al-Qaeda and Taliban members in 
Pakistan.  According to commentators, there were more such strikes in the 
first year of Obama’s administration than in the last three years of the Bush 
administration.  CIA operatives have reportedly been involved in targeted 
killing operations in Yemen and Somalia as well, although in Yemen the 
operations  are  carried  out  by  Yemeni  forces,  with  the  CIA  assisting  in 
planning,  munitions  supply,  and  tactical  guidance.    Obama  has  also left 
intact the authority granted by his predecessor to the CIA and the military 
to kill American citizens abroad, if they are involved in terrorism against the 
United States.4   
 
B.  Israel 
 
Since  its  creation  in  1948,  Israel  has  assassinated  various  enemy 
targets,  including  Egyptian  intelligence  officers  involved  in  orchestrating 
infiltrations into Israel in the 1950’s, German scientists developing missiles 
for Nasser’s Egypt in the 1960’s, Black September members following the 
Munich Olympics massacre of 1972, and prominent leaders of Palestinian 
and Lebanese terrorist networks such as the secretary general of Hezbollah 
in 1992.  Israel even planned an assassination operation against Saddam 
Hussein after the Gulf War. 
 
But  it  was  only  during  the  Second  Intifada,  which  began  in 
September 2000, that targeted killings became a declared and overt policy 
in the fight against terrorism.  Since the first publicly acknowledged targeted 
killing operation by Israel in November 2000, there have been many dozens 
of such operations, mostly in Gaza and only rarely in the West Bank.  The 
use  of  targeted  killing  operations  increased  with  the  level  of  Palestinian 
violence and decreased with the prospects of peaceful relations between the 
parties.  Following waves of suicide bombings, there was a surge in targeted 
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killing  operations;  when  there  were  declarations  of  ceasefire  or  when 
political processes were underway, operations were halted. 
 
The  process  for  approving  targeted  killing  operations  in  Israel 
involves an intelligence “incrimination” of the target, which identifies the 
target as a person actively involved in acts of terrorism; a plan for the time, 
place, and means of the attack (most commonly, an airstrike); consideration 
of  the  danger  of  collateral  damage;  and  a  review  of  potential  political 
ramifications.  The complete plan must receive the approval of a top-level 
political official.  There is no external review process, judicial or other. 
 
The  stated  Israeli  policy  is  that  only  members  of  a  terrorist 
organization who are actively involved in an ongoing and direct manner in 
launching,  planning,  preparing,  or  executing  terrorist  attacks  are  lawful 
targets.  In addition, targeted killing operations will not be carried out where 
there is a reasonable possibility of capturing the terrorist alive. 
 
The legitimacy and usefulness of the practice of targeted killings has 
been hotly debated within Israel ever since it became publicly known that 
Israel was employing them.  No incident illustrates the tension between the 
benefits of a legitimate procedure meeting due process standards and the 
national security demands for exigency better than the targeted killing of 
Salah Shehadeh.  Shehadeh was the head of the military wing of Hamas in 
the  Gaza  Strip,  and  was,  according  to  Israeli  intelligence,  directly 
responsible for the killing of scores of Israeli civilians and soldiers and the 
injury of hundreds of others in dozens of attacks. 
  
Initially,  Israeli  officials  had  demanded  that  the  Palestinian 
Authority arrest Shehadeh.  When the Palestinian Authority declined, the 
Israeli government sought to capture him directly, but had to forego such 
plans  when  it  realized  that  Shehadeh  lived  in  the  middle  of  Gaza  City, 
where  no  Israeli  soldiers  had  been  deployed  since  1994,  and  where  any 
attempt to apprehend Shehadeh would turn into a deadly confrontation.  It 
was then that Israel decided to kill him. 
 
On the night of July 22, 2002, an Israeli F-16 aircraft dropped a 
single one-ton bomb on Shehadeh’s house in a residential neighborhood of 
Gaza City, one of the most densely populated areas on the globe.  As a 
result,  Shehadeh  and  his  aide,  as  well  as  Shehadeh’s  wife,  three  of  his Harvard National Security Journal / Vol. 1  153 
children,  and  eleven  other  civilians,  most  of  whom  were  children,  were 
killed.  One hundred and fifty people were injured. 
 
Israeli  officials  claimed  that  the  targeted  killing  of  Shehadeh  was 
designed to prevent him from carrying out future attacks against Israelis.  
They  asserted  that,  according  to  intelligence  reports,  at  the  time  of  his 
killing, Shehadeh was effectively a “ticking bomb,” in the midst of planning 
at least six different attacks on Israelis, including one designed as a “mega-
attack,” involving a truck loaded with a ton of explosives. 
  
In  the  aftermath  of  the  attack,  there  was  little  disagreement  that 
Shehadeh himself was a justified target.  Nonetheless, television images of 
funerals of slain children drew fierce criticism both within and outside of 
Israel.  Legal proceedings were initiated in Britain against the Israel Defense 
Force’s (IDF) Chief of General Staff, the IDF’s air force commander, and 
the commander of the Southern Command.5  A lawsuit under the Alien 
Tort Claims Statute and the Torture Victim Protection Act was filed by the 
Center  for  Constitutional  Rights  in  the  Southern  District  of  New  York 
against the head of the Israel Security Agency at the time, Avi Dichter.6  
The claim was subsequently dismissed by the court.7 
 
Within  Israel,  the  cars  of  air  force  pilots,  normally  considered 
demigods  in  popular  Israeli  culture,  were  sprayed  with  graffiti  insults  of 
“war criminal.”  A year later, twenty-seven pilots declared that they would 
refuse  to  carry  out  any  additional  bombing  missions  in  Gaza.    Israeli 
leftwing activists petitioned the High Court of Justice to order a criminal 
investigation into the attack and also to prevent the air force commander—
Major  General  Dan  Halutz—from  being  promoted  to  Deputy  Chief  of 
General Staff (Halutz later became Chief of General Staff, but resigned after 
the 2006 war in Lebanon).  A criminal proceeding was initiated in Spain by 
relatives  of  the  victims  of  the  attack  on  Shehadeh  against  seven  Israeli 
officials for alleged war crimes (and was later dismissed by a Spanish court). 
  
                                                 
5 The latter flew to London in September 2005 following his discharge from the military, 
but had to stay aboard the plane and return to Israel after being tipped off that he might be 
arrested. 
6 Matar v. Dichter, 500 F. Supp. 2d 284 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
7 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal.  See 
Matar v. Dichter, 563 F.3d 9 (2d Cir. 2009). 2010 / Law and Policy of Targeted Killing 
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In a traditional war context, killing fourteen civilians along with the 
highest  military  commander  of  the  enemy  could  be  considered 
proportionate collateral damage.  For comparison’s sake, the special report 
of the prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia on the NATO operation in Kosovo determined that ten (and 
according  to  some  reports,  seventeen)  civilian  casualties  were  legitimate 
collateral damage for the attack on the Serbian television station. 
 
But  public  opinion  could  not  disentangle  the  proportionality 
question  from  the  broader  political  context  of  the  Israeli-Palestinian 
relationship: the legality and morality of the continued occupation of Gaza 
and  the  West  Bank  (Israel  withdrew  from  Gaza  three  years  later);  the 
perception of failure in conducting the war on terrorism; and the frustration 
over losing the symbolic struggle over “victimhood” to the Palestinians. 
 
A  year  after  the  targeted  killing  of  Shehadeh,  ten  senior  Hamas 
leaders met in a room on the top floor of a residential building in Gaza.  
Bruised  by  the  effects  of  the  Shehadeh  operation,  the  Israeli  security 
agencies decided to use a laser-guided bomb only a quarter of the size of the 
one used to kill Shehadeh.  The Hamas leaders left the room seconds before 
the bomb hit.  The top floor was destroyed, but the group escaped with 
minor scratches.  Had a larger bomb been used, the building would have 
collapsed, together with the Hamas leadership and civilian residents. 
 
Two  years  later,  in  a  newspaper  interview,  Avi  Dichter,  while 
admitting that the pre-operation assessment misjudged the level of collateral 
damage that would result from the attack on Shehadeh, added that “he 
couldn’t  say  how  many  Israelis  paid  with  their  lives  for  the  fact  that 
Shehadeh  continued  to  operate  long  after  Israel  had  the  operational 
capability to harm him, but not the moral will to do it.”  In describing the 
subsequent  failed  attack  on  the  Hamas  leadership  as  “a  miss,”  Dichter 
lamented, “it was the Hamas’ dream team . . . the ceiling collapsed, but the 
team got away.  No one knows how many Israelis were killed as a result of 
the decision [not to use heavier munitions].”8 
 
 
                                                 
8 Amos Harel, Dichter: The Targeted Killing of Hamas Leaders Has Brought About Calm, HA’ARETZ, 
June 1, 2005 (in Hebrew).  Harvard National Security Journal / Vol. 1  155 
 
III.  Choosing the Framework 
 
A.  Justifying Targeted Killings—The War Paradigm 
 
The debate within the United States over the lawfulness of targeted 
killings  has  remained  largely  confined  to  legal  scholarship  and  public 
commentary; the courts have never addressed it.  The Bush administration, 
to a large extent, relied on a December 1989 Memorandum of Law (an 
advisory opinion), issued by the Special Assistant for Law of War Matters to 
The Judge Advocate General of the Army at the time, W. Hays Parks.9  The 
Parks memorandum distinguished the prohibition on illegal assassinations in 
Executive Order 12333 from lawful targeting of individuals or groups who 
pose a direct threat to the United States.  The prohibition, argued Parks, 
applied to covert acts of murder for political reasons.  Legal Advisor to the 
State  Department  at  the  time,  Arbaham  Sofaer,  emphasized  in  his  own 
statements that the prohibition “should not be limited to the planned killing 
only of political officials, but that it should apply to the illegal killing of any 
person,  even  an  ordinary  citizen,  so  long  as  the  act  has  a  political 
purpose.”10  Both Parks and Sofaer, however, asserted that this prohibition 
did not preclude the targeted killing of enemy combatants in wartime or the 
killing in self-defense of specific individuals who pose a direct threat to U.S. 
citizens  or  national  security  in  peacetime.    The  latter,  both  argued,  was 
permissible  under  the  inherent  principle  of  self-defense  to  which  every 
country was entitled under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter (which 
allows  countries  to  use  force  in  self-defense  after  suffering  an  “armed 
attack”)  and  customary  international  law.    Neither  Parks  nor  Sofaer 
expounded on what amounts to direct threat. 
  
                                                 
9 Memorandum from W. Hays Parks, Special Assistant to The Judge Advocate Gen. of the 
Army for Law of War Matters, to The Judge Advocate Gen. of the Army, Executive Order 
12333 and Assassination (Dec. 4, 1989) reprinted in ARMY LAW., Dec. 1989, at 4 [hereinafter 
Parks Memorandum] available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/12-
1989.pdf.  
10 Abraham D. Sofaer, Sixth Annual Waldemar A. Solf Lecture in International Law: Terrorism, the 
Law, and the National Defense, 126 MIL. L. REV. 89, 119 (1989).  For further analysis of the 
Sofaer doctrine, see Kenneth Anderson, Targeted Killing in U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy and 
Law 24–25 (Brookings Inst., Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., & Hoover Inst., Working Paper 
of the Series on Counterterrorism and American Statutory Law, 2009), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1415070.   2010 / Law and Policy of Targeted Killing 
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The Bush administration has favored the paradigm of war, treating 
terrorists as combatants and justifying the targeted killing of terrorists as 
equivalent  to  the  lawful  killing  of  members  of  an  enemy  force  on  any 
battlefield.    Specifically,  the  administration  deemed  terrorists  to  be 
“unlawful  combatants,”  targetable  and  detainable,  but  denied  the  rights 
accorded to lawful detainees, namely, to be treated as prisoners of war if 
captured.  The Bush administration maintained this position even when the 
targeted  killing  took  place  in  Yemen  or  Pakistan,  outside  an  immediate 
theater of hostilities such as Afghanistan.  Given that the war on terrorism 
was  a  “global  war,”  the  Administration  maintained,  there  could  be  no 
geographical boundaries to the theater of war. 
 
However, as we noted in the introduction to this chapter, choosing a 
war paradigm as governing the targeted killings of suspected terrorists is not 
devoid of difficulties.  The killing on the basis of blame rather than status, 
the difficulties in ensuring the accurate identification of the target, and the 
fact that operations take place outside of a defined battlefield—all make the 
war paradigm at best a proximate, but by no means a perfect, fit.  The full 
legal implications of this choice were considered by the Israeli High Court 
of  Justice  (HCJ),  in  its  ruling  on  the  Israeli  practice  of  targeted  killing 
operations in Gaza and the West Bank. 
 
A  petition  was  first  submitted  to  the  HCJ  by  a  group  of  Israeli 
NGOs in late 2001, as the first Israeli targeted killing operations became 
public, but it was dismissed on grounds of justiciability.  In March 2002, 
another petition was submitted, and this time, Supreme Court President 
Aharon Barak ordered the state to respond.  By that time, 339 Palestinians 
had been killed by targeted killing operations during the Second Intifada: 
201  intended  targets  and  129  innocent  bystanders.    No  less  than  seven 
briefs,  covering  hundreds  of  pages  of  arguments  and  documents,  were 
submitted to the court.  In his last decision before retiring from the court, 
President Barak delivered the ruling in December 2006.11  It is probably the 
most  comprehensive  judicial  decision  ever  rendered  addressing  the  legal 
framework of the “war on terrorism.” 
 
Barak began by accepting that, unlike in the era of the First Intifada, 
there was now an “international armed conflict” with Palestinian militants, 
                                                 
11 HCJ 769/02 Public Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Gov’t of Israel (Targeted Killings 
Case) [2005], available at 
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/Files_ENG/02/690/007/a34/02007690.a34.pdf.   Harvard National Security Journal / Vol. 1  157 
which warranted and justified the use of military means, as governed by 
customary international law, to combat terrorism.  For Barak, accepting the 
armed  conflict  paradigm  was,  albeit  implicitly,  a  precondition  to  the 
justification of targeting operations, going far beyond any law enforcement 
method.  Furthermore, his choice of an international armed conflict paradigm 
was singular amongst the opinions of the U.S. Supreme Court as well as 
most  other  commentators,  which  have  favored  a  non-international  armed 
conflict  model.    This  choice  was  possibly  motivated  by  the  fact  that 
international  armed  conflicts  are  subject  to  more  regulation  under 
international law than their non-international counterparts, thereby further 
constraining the government. 
  
Barak,  in  his  decision,  did  not  discuss  the  possibility  of  working 
within a law enforcement paradigm, or the possibility of relying on Article 
51 of the UN Charter to justify the practice.  Indeed, it would have been 
hard to justify a general practice, employed hundreds of times in the same 
territory, as an “exceptional measure” under a self-defense paradigm. 
 
But Barak’s acceptance of the war paradigm as applicable to the 
fight against terrorism was not unqualified.  The remainder of the decision 
was designed to limit the full application of the laws of war and place further 
constraints on the legitimacy of targeted killing operations, in comparison 
with traditional combat. 
 
First, in terms of the classification of terrorists, Barak rejected the 
government’s  claim  that  these  were  unlawful  combatants,  and  found, 
instead, that terrorists were “civilians taking direct part in hostilities.”  This 
choice of a two-group classification (civilian/combatant) vs. a three-group 
classification (civilian/ lawful combatant/unlawful combatant) was intended 
to achieve at least two goals.  The first was to make sure the protections of 
the  Geneva  Conventions  applied  to  the  armed  conflict  with  Palestinian 
terrorists and to avoid the American administration’s conclusion that, as 
“unlawful combatants,” terrorists were entitled to few protections under the 
laws of war. 
  
Second, by refraining from labeling terrorists as “combatants,” the 
ruling  ensured  that  unlike  combatants  on  the  battlefield,  who  were  all 
legitimate targets regardless of rank, role, or threat, terrorists would not be 
targeted  on  the  basis  of  mere  membership  in  a  terrorist  organization; 
instead, an individual culpability of the targeted person, by way of direct 2010 / Law and Policy of Targeted Killing 
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participation in instigating and executing terrorist acts, would have to be 
proven.    A  mere  membership  test  in  the  case  of  Hamas  or  some  other 
Palestinian organizations would have been especially prone to over-inclusive 
application, as alongside their military wings, these organizations also have 
broad political, social, economic, and cultural operations. 
   
The  ruling  also  departed  from  the  traditional  armed  conflict 
paradigm in that it conditioned the legitimacy of targeted killings on the 
absence  of  a  reasonable  alternative  for  capturing  the  terrorist.    On  the 
traditional battlefield, no attempt to capture the enemy or warn the enemy 
in  advance  is  necessary  before  shooting  to  kill.    In  fact,  the  court’s 
requirement  to  try  to  apprehend  the  terrorist  is  far  more  easily  situated 
within a law enforcement model of regular policing operations and signifies 
the uneasiness that the court felt about the war paradigm. 
 
The  Supreme  Court’s  decision  also  addressed  concerns  about 
collateral  damage  to  innocent  civilians  in  the  course  of  targeted  killings 
operations.  At the time the petition was submitted, the ratio of civilians to 
militants  killed  by  targeted  killings  operations  was  1:3—one  civilian  for 
every three militants12 (the ratio has improved substantially since then, and 
in 2007, the rate of civilians hurt in targeted killing operations was 2–3 
percent).13  Barak acknowledged the difficulty in determining what number 
of casualties was “proportionate”: 
 
[O]ne must proceed case by case, while narrowing the area 
of disagreement.  Take the usual case of a combatant, or a 
terrorist  sniper  shooting  at  soldiers  or  civilians  from  his 
porch.  Shooting at him is proportionate even if as a result, 
an innocent civilian neighbor or passerby is harmed.  This is 
not the case if the building is bombed from the air and scores 
of its residents and passerby are harmed. . . .  The hard cases 
are  those  which  are  in  the  space  between  the  extreme 
examples.14 
 
                                                 
12 Note that numbers of militants killed include both the intended targets and their armed 
group associates who were present at the time of the attack and were harmed as a result. 
13 Amos Harel, Pinpointed IAF Attacks in Gaza More Precise, Hurt Fewer Civilians, HA’ARETZ, 
Dec. 30, 2007, available at http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasen/spages/939702.html.  
14 Targeted Killings Case, HCJ 769/02 at ¶ 46. Harvard National Security Journal / Vol. 1  159 
Accordingly, the decision placed an emphasis on the procedure by which 
the targeted killing operation was considered and approved and on the post-
factum debriefing of operations, all in an effort to improve the record on 
collateral harm.  Importantly, however, the decision did not demand a zero 
civilian casualty policy.  In that, it remained more loyal to the war paradigm 
than to a policing paradigm. 
   
Barak  added  that  certain  incidents  might  be  subjected  to  judicial 
review. 
 
The  concern  about  collateral  damage  also  brought  the  court  to 
stipulate  that  in  certain  cases  in  which  there  was  substantial  collateral 
damage, and depending on the conclusions of an investigation into such 
incidents,  it  would  be  appropriate  to  compensate  innocent  civilians  who 
have been harmed.15 
 
To conclude, the Israeli Supreme Court sought a middle ground 
between a more aggressive law enforcement paradigm and a tamer wartime 
paradigm.    It  chose  the  latter  as  its  point  of  departure,  but  then,  in 
consideration  of  the  unique  nature  of  the  war  on  terrorism,  added 
limitations and constraints on the government’s war powers so as to remain 
as loyal as possible to the basic principles and values of the Israeli legal 
system.16 
 
B.  Justifying Targeted Killings—The Exceptional Peacetime Operations 
Paradigm 
 
Could  the  U.S.  administration,  given  the  Parks  memorandum, 
justify targeted killings even without relying on the applicability of military 
powers to a “war on terrorism”?  It would have to find the operation lawful 
under a reasonable interpretation of the domestic law of homicide; it would 
have  to  address  major  issues  of  peacetime  international  law,  including 
human rights laws and the duty to respect the sovereignty of other countries; 
and, of course, it would have to satisfy the constitutional protections found 
in the Bill of Rights, to the extent these are applicable abroad. 
                                                 
15 Id. at ¶ 40. 
16 That the 2008 armed conflict between Israel and Hamas in Gaza looked far more like a 
conventional war may help explain why, only three years after Barak’s decision, Israeli 
forces struck numerous Hamas members who would not have necessarily met the strict tests 
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Domestic  law  enforcement  operations  permit  shooting  to  kill  a 
suspected criminal only under very limited circumstances.  These limitations 
coincide  with  international  human  rights  norms  on  the  use  of  force  by 
governments against citizens.  When the suspect imposes no immediate and 
lethal threat, firing at him to affect an arrest is only constitutional if “the 
officer  has  probable  cause  to  believe  that  the  suspect  poses  a  threat  of 
serious physical harm.”17  There are even greater common law constraints 
on shooting a suspect where there is a concern about collateral harm to 
others  around  the  suspect;  in  such  cases,  law  enforcement  officials  are 
required  to  hold  their  fire  and  refrain  from  risking  innocent  bystanders.  
Still,  under  the  American  Model  Penal  Code  §  3.02,  the  defense  of 
“necessity” or “choice of evils” justifies and thus immunizes conduct “which 
the actor believes to be necessary to avoid a harm or evil to himself or to 
another”  if  the  harm  to  be  avoided  is  greater  than  that  sought  to  be 
prevented by the law defining the crime (intentional killing, in this case), and 
so long as there is no reason to believe the legislature intended to exclude 
this justification.  Under this statement of the American rule the danger of 
the harm to be avoided need not be imminent and the rule would justify 
homicide  as  well  as  less  serious  crimes.    Thus,  in  some  jurisdictions  the 
wording need hardly be stretched to make legal under domestic law the 
killing of an active participant in a terrorist scheme to kill many others, if 
that  way  of  aborting  the  plan  is  believed  to  be  necessary.    In  other 
jurisdictions  the  law  would  have  to  be  changed  to  allow  intentional 
homicides or consideration of non-imminent harms. 
 
As for international human rights laws, the possibility of using deadly 
force against individuals who are threatening the security of the state has not 
been rejected altogether even by international human rights bodies.  The 
Human  Rights  Committee,  in  its  response  to  the  Israeli  report  on  the 
practice of targeted killings, notes only that “[b]efore resorting to the use of 
deadly  force,  all  measures  to  arrest  a  person  suspected  of  being  in  the 
process of committing acts of terror must be exhausted.”18  It adds that such 
operations must never be carried out for purposes of retribution or revenge, 
thus implying that they may be legitimate if intended at preemption. 
                                                 
17 Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985). 
18 U.N. Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Israel, 
¶ 15, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/78/ISR (Aug. 21, 2003), available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/%28Symbol%29/CCPR.CO.78.ISR.En?OpenDocu
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The 2002 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Report on 
Terrorism and Human Rights19 similarly leaves room for the use of deadly force 
against suspected terrorists, even under a general law enforcement model.  
It  notes  that  “in  situations  where  a  state’s  population  is  threatened  by 
violence, the state has the right and obligation to protect the population 
against  such  threats  and  in  so  doing  may  use  lethal  force  in  certain 
situations.”20  It goes on to assert the natural implication that, in their law 
enforcement initiatives, “states must not use force against individuals who 
no longer present a threat as described above, such as individuals who have 
been apprehended by authorities, have surrendered or who are wounded 
and abstain from hostile acts.”21 
 
And in its decision in the case of Isayeva, the European Court of 
Human Rights acknowledged the right of a state—Russia—to use deadly 
force against Chechen rebels, even when there was no indication that the 
latter were posing an immediate threat to the Russian forces.22 
 
But outside the territory of the United States, the government is also 
limited  by  the  international  norms  protecting  each  state’s  sovereignty  in 
using force to capture or kill suspected criminals.  As a general principle of 
international  law,  a  country  is  strictly  prohibited  from  engaging  in  law 
enforcement operations in the territory of another country, and much more 
so when the law enforcement operation includes killing a person.  Deadly 
attacks  by  air  strikes  or  drones  directly  implicate  the  international 
prohibition  on  the  use  of  force  between  states.    How,  then,  could  the 
government justify targeted killing operations under international law in any 
way other than relying on a war/combatants paradigm? 
 
The Parks memorandum addresses the question of lawful targeting 
and unlawful assassinations in peacetime, and argues the following: 
 
The use of force in peacetime is limited by the previously 
cited  article  2(4)  of  the  Charter  of  the  United  Nations.  
                                                 
19 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.116, Doc. 5 Rev. 1 Corr (Oct. 22, 2002), available at 
http://www.cidh.oas.org/Terrorism/Eng/exe.htm.    
20 Id. ¶ 87. 
21 Id. ¶ 91.  
22 Isayeva v. Russia, 41 Eur. Ct. H. R. 847 ¶ 181 (2005); see also Isayeva v. Russia, App. No. 
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However, article 51 of the Charter recognizes the inherent 
right  of  self-defense  of  nations.    Historically,  the  United 
States has resorted to the use of military force in peacetime 
where another nation has failed to discharge its international 
responsibilities  in  protecting  U.S.  citizens  from  acts  of 
violence  originating  in  or  launched  from  its  sovereign 
territory,  or  has  been  culpable  in  aiding  and  abetting 
international criminal activities.23 
 
Parks goes on to give the examples of an 1804–1805 Marine expedition into 
Libya to capture or kill the Barbary pirates; a year-long campaign in 1916 
into Mexico to capture or kill the Mexican bandit Pancho Villa following 
Villa’s attack on Columbus, New Mexico; the 1928–1932 U.S. Marines’ 
campaign to capture or kill the Nicaraguan bandit leader Augusto Cesar 
Sandino;  the  Army’s  assistance  in  1967  to  the  Bolivian  Army  in  its 
campaign to capture or kill Ernesto “Che” Guevara; the forcing down in 
1985 of an Egypt Air plane in Sicily, in an attempt to prevent the escape of 
the Achille Lauro hijackers; and the 1986 attacks on terrorist-related targets in 
Libya. 
 
These historical precedents, claims Parks, support the interpretation 
of the United Nations Charter as authorizing the use of military force to 
capture or kill individuals whose peacetime actions constitute a direct threat 
to U.S. citizens or national security.  In a footnote, he adds: 
 
In the employment of military force, the phrase “capture or 
kill” carries the same meaning or connotation in peacetime 
as  it  does  in  wartime.    There  is  no  obligation  to  capture 
rather  than  attack  the  enemy.    In  some  cases,  it  may  be 
preferable to utilize ground forces to capture (e.g.) a known 
terrorist.  However, where the risk to U.S. forces is deemed 
too great . . . it would be legally permissible to employ (e.g.) 
an  air  strike  against  that  individual  or  group  rather  than 
attempt his, her, or their capture, and would not constitute 
assassination.24 
 
If  so,  targeted  killings,  as  they  have  been  used  by  the  United  States  in 
Yemen, Pakistan, and elsewhere, may well have been justified without ever 
                                                 
23 Parks Memorandum, supra note 9, at 7. 
24 Id. at 8 n.14. Harvard National Security Journal / Vol. 1  163 
relying  on  a  “war  on  terrorism,”  but  instead  by  being  framed  as  an 
exceptional  use  of  force  in  self-defense  alongside  peacetime  law 
enforcement.  Although Parks does not expound upon this point, from his 
equation of military action in peacetime with that of wartime, it seems he 
would accept some degree of collateral damage in a peacetime operation 
under similar logic of a wartime attack. 
 
Choosing a peacetime framework with some allowance for military 
action  is  not  free  from  difficulties.    One  obvious  problem  is  that  the 
“exceptional” use of force has been turned, in the context of the war on 
terrorism,  into  a  continuous  practice.    In  addition,  the  degree  to  which 
countries should be allowed to use force extraterritorially against non-state 
elements  has  been  debated  extensively  by  both  international  law  and 
domestic law scholars.  The implications of allowing the use of armed force 
to capture or kill enemies outside a country’s own territory, and outside a 
theater  of  traditional  armed  conflict,  may  include  spiraling  violence,  the 
erosion  of  territorial  sovereignty,  and  a  weakening  of  international 
cooperation. 
  
Once the precedent is laid for a broad interpretation of Article 51 of 
the  UN  Charter,  as  existing  alongside  or  as  an  exception  to  normal 
peacetime limitations, it becomes harder to distinguish what is allowed in 
peace from what is allowed in war.  It is for these reasons that not everyone 
accepts Parks’ legal reasoning, with critics arguing that any military attack 
on another country’s territory, outside an armed conflict with that country, 
amounts to unlawful aggression.  Thus, in the case of Armed Activities on the 
Territory of the Congo25, the International Court of Justice, in a decision widely 
criticized,  went  as  far  as  to  rule  that  Uganda  had  no  right  to  use  force 
against  armed  rebels  attacking  it  from  the  territory  of  the  Democratic 
Republic  of  Congo.    Recently,  the  U.N.  Special  Rapporteur  on 
Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Executions, concluded that reliance 
on  the  exceptional  self-defense  argument  under  Article  51  in  support  of 
targeted  killings  “would  diminish  hugely  the  value  of  the  foundational 
prohibition contained in Article 51.”26 
                                                 
25 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 
I.C.J. 116 (Dec. 19). 
26 Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Report of the 
Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Execution: Study on Targeted Killings, ¶ 41, 
delivered to the Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010), 
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Even  if  justified  as  an  exception  to  a  peacetime  paradigm,  one 
obvious precondition for the legality of targeted killing operations outside a 
theater of war, in consideration of the other countries’ sovereignty, must be 
that the state in whose territory the terrorist resides either consent to the 
operation by the foreign power (as in the case of the collaboration between 
the United States and Yemen) or else would be unable or unwilling to take 
action against the terrorist (as in the case of targeted killings in Gaza).  On 
some rare occasions there may be an overwhelming necessity to act without 
the immediate possibility of obtaining the other country’s consent. 
  
Note that under a law enforcement model, a country cannot target 
any individual in its own territory unless there is no other way to avert a 
great danger.  If so, if the Yemeni authorities can capture a terrorist alive, 
they  cannot  authorize  the  United  States  to  engage  in  a  targeted  killing 
operation in its territory or execute one on its own. 
 
To sum up, targeted killings of terrorists by both the United States 
and Israel have been justified under a war paradigm: in the American case, 
by treating terrorists as (unlawful) combatants; in the Israeli case, by treating 
terrorists as civilians who are taking direct part in hostilities.  It seems that a 
persuasive argument can also be made that under some conditions, targeted 
killings  of  suspected  terrorists  can  be  justified  on  the  basis  of  a  law 
enforcement  paradigm.    When  conducted  in  the  territory  of  another 
country, targeted killing must be based on a self-defense exception to the 
international law prohibition on the use of force, and in consideration of 
that  other  country’s  sovereignty,  should  only  be  executed  if  that  other 
country either consents to the operation or else is unable and unwilling to 
interdict the terrorist. 
 
In the conclusion of this chapter, we set forth what the legitimate 
contours of the use of targeted killing must be.  We conclude that they seem 
to  fit  both  a  more  constrained  war  paradigm  and  a  more  lax  law 
enforcement  paradigm  (although  the  latter  suits  more  sporadic  and 
measured use of the tactic).  For present purposes it should be noted that if 
we  take  the  Israeli  Supreme  Court’s  decision  as  controlling,  then  the 
conditions for the legitimacy of targeted killings of terrorists in the armed 
conflict between Israel and Palestinian militants are not very different from 
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those that would apply under a law enforcement model.  Both would allow 
the targeted killing of some terrorists in Gaza and both would prohibit—or 
place greater constraints—on the targeting of suspected terrorists outside a 
conventional theater of war if the alternative of capture was feasible. 
 
IV.  Strategic Aspects 
 
Even if legally justifiable and morally permissible, the strategic value 
of employing targeted killings is far from clear and depends very much on 
the situation.  As with any other counterterrorism tactic, targeted killings 
carry both strategic benefits and costs. 
 
A.  The Potential Hazards of Targeted Killings 
 
An  immediate  consequence  of  eliminating  leaders  of  terrorist 
organizations will sometimes be what may be called the Hydra effect, the 
rise  of  more—and  more  resolute—leaders  to  replace  them.    The 
decapitating  of  the  organization  may  also  invite  retaliation  by  the  other 
members and followers of the organization.  Thus, when Israel assassinated 
Abbas  Mussawi,  Hezbollah‘s  leader  in  Lebanon,  in  1992,  a  more 
charismatic and successful leader, Hassan Nassrallah, succeeded Mussawi.  
The armed group then avenged the assassination of its former leader in two 
separate  attacks,  blowing  up  Israeli  and  Jewish  targets  in  Buenos  Aires, 
killing over a hundred people and injuring hundreds more. 
 
Targeted  killing  may  also  interfere  with  important  gathering  of 
critical intelligence.  The threat of being targeted will drive current leaders 
into hiding, making the monitoring of their movements and activities by the 
counterterrorist forces more difficult.  Moreover, if these leaders are found 
and killed, instead of captured, the counterterrorism forces lose the ability to 
interrogate  them  to  obtain  potentially  valuable  information  about  plans, 
capabilities, or organizational structure. 
 
The political message flowing from the use of targeted killings may 
be harmful to the attacking country’s interest, as it emphasizes the disparity 
in  power  between  the  parties  and  reinforces  popular  support  for  the 
terrorists, who are seen as a David fighting Goliath.  Moreover, by resorting 
to  military  force  rather  than  to  law  enforcement,  targeted  killings  might 
strengthen  the  sense  of  legitimacy  of  terrorist  operations,  which  are 
sometimes viewed as the only viable option for the weak to fight against a 2010 / Law and Policy of Targeted Killing 
 
166 
powerful  empire.    If  collateral  damage  to  civilians  accompanies  targeted 
killings, this, too, may bolster support for what seems like the just cause of 
the terrorists, at the same time as it weakens domestic support for fighting 
the terrorists. 
 
When targeted killing operations are conducted on foreign territory, 
they run the risk of heightening international tensions between the targeting 
government  and  the  government  in  whose  territory  the  operation  is 
conducted.    Israel’s  relations  with  Jordan  became  dangerously  strained 
following  the  failed  attempt  in  September  1997  in  Jordan  to  assassinate 
Khaled Mashaal, the leader of Hamas.  Indeed, international relations may 
suffer even where the local government acquiesces in the operation, but the 
operation fails or harms innocent civilians, bringing the local government 
under political attack from domestic constituencies (recall the failed attack in 
Pakistan on Al-Zawahiri that left eighteen civilians dead). 
 
Even if there is no collateral damage, targeted killings in another 
country’s  territory  threatens  to  draw  criticism  from  local  domestic 
constituencies against the government, which either acquiesced or was too 
weak to stop the operation in its territory.  Such is the case now in both 
Pakistan and Yemen, where opposition forces criticize the governments for 
permitting American armed intervention in their countries. 
   
The  aggression  of  targeted  killings  also  runs  the  risk  of  spiraling 
hatred and violence, numbing both sides to the effects of killing and thus 
continuing the cycle of violence.  Each attack invites revenge, each revenge 
invites further retaliation.  Innocent civilians suffer whether they are the 
intended target of attack or its unintentional collateral consequences. 
 
Last but not least, exceptional measures tend to exceed their logic. 
As in the case of extraordinary detention or interrogation methods, there is 
a danger of over-using targeted killings, both within and outside of the war 
on terrorism.  A particular danger in this context arises as the killing of a 
terrorist often proves a simpler operation than protracted legal battles over 
detention, trial, extradition, and release. 
 
B.  The Benefits Nations Seek 
 
At  the  most  basic  level,  targeted  killings,  which  are  generally 
undertaken with less risk to the attacking force than are arrest operations, Harvard National Security Journal / Vol. 1  167 
may  be  effective.    According  to  some  reports,  the  killing  of  leaders  of 
Palestinian armed groups weakened the will and ability of these groups to 
execute suicide attacks against Israelis.  By deterring the leaders of terrorist 
organizations  and  creating  in  some  cases  a  structural  vacuum,  waves  of 
targeted killing operations were followed by a lull in subsequent terrorist 
attacks, and in some instances, brought the leaders of Palestinian factions to 
call  for  a  ceasefire.    The  Obama  administration  embraced  the  targeted 
killing tactic, holding it to be the most effective way to get at Al-Qaeda and 
Taliban members in the ungoverned and ungovernable tribal areas along 
the Afghanistan-Pakistan border or in third countries. 
  
Despite  the  adverse  effects  such  operations  may  have  on  the 
attitudes  of  the  local  population  toward  the  country  employing  targeted 
killings,  the  demonstration  of  superiority  in  force  and  resolve  may  also 
dishearten the supporters of terrorism. 
 
Publicly acknowledged targeted killings are furthermore an effective 
way of appeasing domestic audiences, who expect the government “to do 
something” when they are attacked by terrorists.  The visibility and open 
aggression of the operation delivers a clearer message of “cracking down on 
terrorism” than covert or preventive measures that do not yield immediate 
demonstrable results.  The result in Israel has been to make a vast majority 
of  citizens  supportive  of  targeted  killings,  despite  the  latter’s  potential 
adverse  effects.    And,  perhaps  surprisingly,  of  all  the  coercive 
counterterrorism  techniques  employed  by  the  United  States,  targeted 
killings have so far attracted the least public criticism.  
 
V.  Conclusions 
 
Targeted  killing  operations  display  more  clearly  than  any  other 
counterterrorism tactic the tension between labeling terrorism a crime and 
labeling it an act of war.  If a terror attack is simply a crime, counterterrorism 
forces would follow the same laws and rules as the Chicago or Miami police 
department do in fighting crime, where intentional killing could rarely if 
ever  be  lawful,  other  than  where  necessary  in  a  situation  immediately 
requiring the defense of self or others, or in making an arrest of an obviously 
dangerous felon.  From the perspective of international peacetime relations, 
targeted killings face even greater legal constraints when targeting a terrorist 
outside the state’s jurisdiction. 
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If a terrorist plan is an act of war by the organization supporting it, 
any member of any such terrorist organization may be targeted anytime and 
anywhere  plausibly  considered  “a  battlefield,”  without  prior  warning  or 
attempt to capture. 
  
Known or anticipated collateral damage to the innocent is generally 
prohibited in law enforcement, but is legitimate within the boundaries of 
proportionality  in  fighting  wars.    In  fighting  crime,  the  government’s 
obligation  to  protect  its  citizens  applies  to  all  citizens—criminals  and 
innocents.  In fighting wars, the government’s primary obligation is to its 
own citizens, with only limited concern for the well-being of its enemies. 
 
Assuming, as we do, that states do have a right to defend themselves 
against acts of terrorism, targeted killings cannot be always illegal and 
immoral.  But because terrorism is not a traditional war, nor a traditional 
crime, its non-traditional nature must affect the ethical and strategic 
considerations that inform targeted killings, the legal justification behind 
them, and the choice of targets and methods used to carry them out.  
 
As we have shown, targeted killings may be justified even without 
declaring an all-out “war” on terrorism.  A war paradigm is overbroad in 
the  sense  that  it  allows  the  targeting  of  any  member  of  a  terrorist 
organization.    For  the  United  States,  it  has  had  no  geographical  limits.  
When any suspected member of a hostile terrorist organization—regardless 
of function, role, or degree of contribution to the terrorist effort—might be 
targeted anywhere around the world without any due process guarantees or 
monitoring procedures, targeted killings run grave risks of doing both short-
term and lasting harm.  In contrast, a peacetime paradigm that enumerates 
specific exceptions for the use of force in self-defense is more legitimate, 
more narrowly tailored to the situation, offers potentially greater guarantees 
for  the  rule  of  law.    It  is,  however,  harder  to  justify  targeted  killing 
operations under a law enforcement paradigm when the tactic is used as a 
continuous and systematic practice rather than as an exceptional measure.  
Justifying targeted killings under a law enforcement paradigm also threatens 
to  erode  the  international  rules  that  govern  peacetime  international 
relations as well as the human rights guarantees that governments owe their 
own citizens. 
  
Whichever  paradigm  we  choose  as  out  starting  point,  greater 
limitations  than  those  offered  by  the  Parks  memorandum  or  that  are Harvard National Security Journal / Vol. 1  169 
currently operating in the American targeted killings program should be 
adopted.  The limits set by the Israeli Supreme Court—ironically, within 
the paradigm of wartime operations—are a good place to start. 
 
First, the tactic should not be used unilaterally by the endangered 
state if the host country of the terrorists is willing and able to act on its own 
to  arrest  or  disable  in  a  timely  manner  the  source  of  the  threat.    Host 
country cooperation in capture and extradition must be the first alternative 
considered.    That  is,  targeted  killings  must  only  be  carried  out  as  an 
extraordinary  measure,  where  the  alternative  of  capture  or  arrest  is 
unfeasible. 
 
Second, only those who are actively and directly involved in terrorist 
activities are legitimate targets; not every member of a terrorist organization 
is or should be. 
 
Third, the fact that terrorists do not wear uniforms should not give 
them  an  unfair  legal  advantage  over  soldiers  in  uniform  in  the  sense  of 
immunity  from  deliberate  attack.    But  their  lack  of  uniform  does  raise 
legitimate concerns about the ability to ensure the correct identification of 
the target, in terms of personal identity as well as specific culpability.  Any 
targeted killing operation must therefore include mechanisms in its planning 
and execution phases that would ensure an accurate identification.  Such 
mechanisms need not involve external judicial review; judges are neither 
well situated nor do they have the requisite expertise to authorize or reject 
an operation on the basis of intelligence reports.  Rather, the system should 
be  based  on  verified  and  verifiable  intelligence  data  from  different  and 
independent sources, careful monitoring, and safety mechanisms that would 
allow aborting the mission in case of doubt. 
 
The  concern  about  collateral  damage  requires  specific  attention.  
Unlike ordinary battlefield strikes, the fact that the targeting forces have 
control  over  the  time,  means,  and  methods  of  strike  mandates  that  a 
heightened degree of care should be exercised to choose an occasion and 
means  that  will  minimize  collateral  harm  to  uninvolved  individuals, 
especially  where  the  operations  are  carried  out  outside  an  immediate 
conflict zone.  In those cases, we believe that where innocent civilians suffer 
collateral damage, those injured should generally be compensated. 
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Finally,  the  aggression  of  the  targeted  killing  tactic  mandates  its 
measured  use  in  only  the  most  urgent  and  necessary  of  cases.    The 
government’s interest should be to tame violence, not exacerbate it.  Where 
alternatives exist, they should be pursued, not just as a matter of law but also 
as a matter of sound policy. 